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Introduction 
Technologies are not mere external utilities. They are profoundly involved 
within human development. This involvement can by explained in various 
ways. And, since technologies have a historical development, they can 
acquire metaphysical baggage.1 One way to conceptualise technology is 
prosthesis: a tool—from a flint or a hammer, to language—that extends 
or enables capacities. I’ll discuss prosthesis as a human-technology 
relation, and consider three such conceptualisations—instrumentalism, 
Bernard Stiegler’s ‘originary technicity’, and Gilbert Simondon’s 
‘concretisation’—and discuss their relevance to and potential for thinking 
about disability. 
 
Early Theories of Technology 
Early theories of technology take one of two forms: instrumentalism and 
substantivism. In the former—which is ubiquitous—technologies are 
tools; mere means awaiting use towards autonomously-formulated human 
                                               
1 Yuk Hui, On the Existence of Digital Objects (London: University of Minnesota Press, 
2016). 
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ends.2 They are epistemically and ethically neutral, or “subservient to 
values established in other… spheres”.3 Instrumentalism is broadly 
optimistic: technologies are means towards freedom. Substantivism tends 
towards pessimism. Here, technology is no mere means, but an 
autonomous force that distorts or replaces other values, and determines 
behaviour.4 This follows from its underlying, instrumental logic. This 
engenders an objectivising disposition towards others and world—as mere 
manipulable resources—that alienates humans from their non-
technological nature. 
Diﬀerences notwithstanding, these share a cluster of related ontological 
presuppositions that flow from oppositions between natural and artificial, 
human and nonhuman.5 I’ll concentrate on instrumentalism, and briefly 
mention three. The first is most fundamental: the principle of essentialism. 
There exists some specification of what the human is, which properties it 
possesses. Second, the principle of autonomy. This exclusively human 
property is fundamental to definition of the human, and requires—in 
principle, if not always in fact—no additional material for its exercise. 
Humans are autonomous subjects for whom technology is a mere 
objective means: these extend a freedom that passes through them while 
                                               
2 Aristotle, Physics, trans. Robin Waterfield, Oxford World's Classics (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008). 
3 Andrew Feenberg, Transforming Technology: A Critical Theory Revisited (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 5. Peter Kroes and Peter-Paul Verbeek, "Introduction: The Moral 
Status of Technical Artefacts," in The Moral Status of Technical Artefacts, ed. Peter Kroes 
and Peter-Paul Verbeek (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014). 
4 Feenberg, Transforming Technology 5. Marx, and later the Frankfurt School, diagnose that 
modes of production, and associated technologies, determine social relations. See also 
Jacques Ellul, and the Heidegger of The Age of the World Picture and The Question Concerning 
Technology. Ellul, The Technological Society, trans. John Wilkinson (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1964). Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (New York: 
Harper Perennial, 2013). 
5 Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1993). 
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leaving no trace.6 Finally, the principle of externality. Technology is fully 
exterior to the human. It is a neutral means to solely human ends. I’ll call 
this position—that betrays a clear humanist bent—‘weak prosthesis’: 
weak, because technology makes no profound contribution to, and has no 
enduring eﬀect upon, human essence. It includes any technological 
intervention that purports to extend or restore human properties without 
changing the human itself. 
 
Instrumentalism and Disability 
I’ll turn now to disability, and how this separation between human essence 
and technology plays out in the concept of normal function. Medical 
accounts often consider disability an individual problem occasioned by a 
dysfunctional bodily property. In Christopher Boorse’s ‘normal function’ 
concept, the "normal is the natural”, while diseases are “foreign to the 
nature of the species”.7 Humans unable to perform his normal activities—
speaking, walking—are dysfunctional. Impairment essentially and directly 
correlates with health reduction and warrants correction or rehabilitation. 
Some medical ethicists adopt this as a regulatory standard.8 Here 
biological deviation from normal function—taken as objective—correlates 
with decreased social opportunity as a ‘normal competitor’, or decreased 
                                               
6 Kroes and Verbeek interestingly note that positive metaphors about technology tend to 
ascribe goodness to the wisdom of its human users, while negative assessments indict 
technology precisely for having its own autonomy: while a human creation, it goes on to 
resist, override, or even determine, human will. 
7 Christopher Boorse, "Health As a Theoretical Concept", Philosophy of Science 44, no. 4 
(1977): 542-573; "A Rebuttal on Health," in What Is Disease?, ed. J.M. Humber and R.F. 
Almeder (Totowa, NJ: Humana Press, 1997). 
8 Allen E. Buchanan et al, From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000). Norman Daniels, "Justice and Health Care," in Health 
Care Ethics: An Introduction, ed. Donald VanDeVeer and Tom Regan (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1987). 
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quality of life.9 Only those who see, walk, talk, access “the ‘normal 
opportunity range’”.10 Accordingly, medicine and technology help by 
restoring normal function. 
I don’t mean that such intervention is always negative, or to discount 
positive reports by those using prosthetics or undergoing interventions 
that replicate functional and aesthetic norms. My concern is with 
technology and production of the human. I’m suggesting that weak 
prosthesis does more than it admits. The implied boundary between 
human and technology obscures their myriad interleavings. It stabilises 
across time the organising concept of human essence whose autonomy 
correlates with morphological properties. Its purported neutrality 
obfuscates this productive role. This occurs in diﬀerent technological 
registers: from the operative idea of ‘restoration’ for those with congenital 
impairments, to instruments that monitor for foetal ‘abnormalities’, 
resulting in selective termination. I’m not debating the ethics of these 
practices. I’m suggesting that technological intervention reproduces and 
renegotiates a boundary within the living between normalcy and 
deviation, and that this boundary is not read oﬀ nature, but introduced 
into it. 
 
Stiegler and Technics 
Latterly, philosophers of technology have undertaken an ontological 
reorientation away from dualism, and understand humans as profoundly 
                                               
9 The From Chance to Choice authors claim to broadly accept the social model of disability as 
land out in the UPIAS manifesto. However, their actual argumentation consistently 
connects diminished opportunity to biological deficit. 
10 Ron Amundson, "Against Normal Function", Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological 
and Biomedical Sciences 31, no. 1 (2000): 33-53. See, for example, Buchanan et al: “Justice 
includes a commitment to equal opportunity, and genetically based disabilities, like other 
disabilities, impair opportunity”. From Chance to Choice 270. 
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interrelated with technologies. I’ll talk about Bernard Stiegler, then 
discuss some implications for disability and prosthesis. 
I’ll call his position strong or ‘constitutive’ prosthesis, because it 
understands technology as internal to the definition of humanitas. The 
human is constituted as such through technological activity.11 Stiegler’s 
argument goes roughly as follows. The human is ‘born too early’: it has no 
inherent capacities, including memory. This susceptibility—human lack—
is constitutive, originary. What the human has, essentially, is nothing: its 
essence is indetermination. It fabricates technology to mitigate this 
deficiency. Such supplements as language, sociality, tools, transform 
environs and, ultimately, defer death.12 The human exists as its concurrent 
externalisation in technical materials, and internalisation of this prosthetic 
ek-sistence: co-constitution of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, not addition of external 
technology to preexisting interiority.13 
Finally, this ruptures from ‘pure’ biological life. Technology comprises 
a new “inorganic organisation of memory”: human culture embodied in 
                                               
11 Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time: The Fault of Epimetheus, trans. Geoﬀrey Beardsworth 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998). Stiegler contests Heidegger’s assertions that 
the essence of technology is outside technics, and that there are other, more open modes 
of world revealing than that of technology. What Heidegger overlooks in his search for a 
more poetic mode of world disclosure is that humans simply are in virtue of their relation 
with technics. Technics comprises nothing less than the horizon of human existence: the 
genesis of technics corresponds precisely with the genesis of the human. 
12 Stiegler’s position echoes that of Arnold Gehlen, for whom humans are Mängelwesen: 
fundamentally deficient, and thus in need of technologies to compensate for this, so to 
survive in an environment to which they are not naturally adapted. Gehlen, Man, His 
Nature and Place in the World, trans. Clare McMillan and Karl Pillemer (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1988). 
13 “[M]an invents himself in technics by inventing the tool—by ‘externalising’ himself 
techno-logically […] the interior is invented through this movement: it cannot precede it” 
Stiegler, Technics and Time 141-2. The evident fallacy of Rousseau and others is to posit a 
relation of succession between a pure and anterior human that only then externalises itself; 
a true origin that antedates its fall into contingency. In fact, the inside is produced precisely 
in the movement of exteriorisation. 
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enduring technical artefacts.14 Humans are definitively shifted from 
genetic into non-genetic memory, liberated from genetics, and subject to 
new, non-biological exigencies, which increases their indetermination.15 
This looks fruitful for disability and prosthesis. If the ‘human condition’ 
is technological compensation for inherent vulnerability, everyone is 
lacking, and none are complete. Moreover, technics is precisely liberation 
from biology. Consequently, disability need not identify a categorial 
division between completeness and insuﬃciency, between fully and 
partially human. Finally, technologies need not approximate normal 
function. 
However, Stiegler shouldn’t be embraced too hastily. First, he separates 
biology and technology too forcefully, to under-acknowledge relations 
between body and technics. ‘Man’ still evolves biologically as an animal, 
but becomes human only through technical evolution: using tools to 
anticipate possibilities other than those proscribed by genetics. Human 
invention principally concerns a vie d’esprit that is not biological, but 
technically-instantiated. Even though this  vie d’esprit exists in material 
technologies, this rehearses a merely technologised mind-body dualism.16 
Externalisation in technics is simultaneously internalisation within the 
human, but only within technical subjectivity. This subjectivity is divided 
                                               
14 Creation issues from this historical lineage as sedimented within inorganic memory. 
15 For Stiegler, instinct approaches genetic determination. The human possesses a kind of 
intelligence that oﬀers a total freeing from such pre-determination. There are shades of 
capacity to choose: a vertebrate has greater latitude than an ant. 
16 Defenders suggest that this is not so. Gerald Moore claims that Stiegler is suggesting that 
“humanity has no essential basis in biology”, and that technics is in principle available to 
any living being. But this seems just as anthropocentric: if animals could use tools, they 
would be just like humans. Gerald Moore, "Adapt and Smile or Die!: Stiegler Among the 
Darwinists," in Stiegler and Technics, ed. Christina Howells and Gerald Moore (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 27. 
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robustly from the biological body—equated by Stiegler with ‘stupidity’17—
rendering obscure just how technology aﬀects the body. This problem 
cannot be overstated, since his basic position is that humans exist precisely 
at their point of separation from biological features.18 This approaches a 
denial that biology is an aspect of humanity. 
This echoes debates in disability studies concerning whether impairment 
is a biological or social artefact. In Stiegler’s account, impairment would 
reside in the biological register, though it could radically be overcome by 
technics. This suggests an inability to address adequately a question 
motivating this paper: what role do technologies already play in 
disability?19 Surely biology and technology do not have separate causal 
histories?20 I’ll suggest that the very emergence of disability is enacted in 
and through relations between bodies and technologies, broadly 
construed, that regularise valued and disvalued properties. 
A second problem concerns lack: Stiegler rejects a fixed biological 
nature for an equally universal foundation. That humans are fragile as a 
matter of empirical fact doesn’t warrant the overdetermination of this state 
                                               
17 It is not insignificant that Stiegler begins from Lacanian premises. As Thomas LaMarre 
notes, this lends his account a psychoanalytic tenor. The human must recognise and 
reconcile itself to its essentially fragile nature. Thomas LaMarre, "Afterword: Humans and 
Machines," in Gilbert Simondon and the Philosophy of the Transindividual, Technologies of 
Lived Abstraction (London: MIT Press, 2012). 
18 This also entails a robust division between nature (locked into evolutionary adaptation and 
mechanistic repetition) and culture (liberated by technics to radically innovate). This is 
reminiscent of Sartre’s existentialism, that goes even further to eﬀectively deny that the 
human has biological features. Roberto Esposito, "Politics and Human Nature", Angelaki: 
Journal of the Theoretical Humanities 16, no. 3 (2011). 
19 My suggestion is twofold: first, technologies replicate purportedly natural human 
functions. The first follows from the aforementioned tendency to assume normal function 
as an objective fact, and to conceptualise technologies through that lens. 
20 While it is beyond the scope of this paper, contemporary philosophy of biology suggests 
that Stiegler’s adaptationist account is also rather outmoded. See the work of Susan 
Oyama: The Ontogeny of Information: Developmental Systems and Evolution. Second ed. 
London: Duke University Press, 2000; Evolution’s Eye: A Systems View of the Biology-
Culture Divide. London: Duke University Press, 2000. 
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of aﬀairs into an ontological ground. Crucially, taking humans as equally 
vulnerable engenders a homogeneous conception that flattens out bodily 
diversity, and the variable vulnerability that attends such diversity.21 More 
precisely, this claim can only find purchase by disregarding embodiment. 
Even assuming that we accept vulnerability as the human predicament, 
starting from concrete particular bodies (as does Simondon) would instead 
suggest heterogeneity, and vulnerability by degrees. 
 
Simondon and Individuation 
So, while Stiegler’s originary technicity looked promising, it doesn’t 
address the body’s own contingency, and its interrelation with, not 
transcendence by, technology. I’ll turn to Gilbert Simondon’s work to this 
end, before making some suggestions about technology’s role in the 
production of the human. 
Simondon’s organising concept is individuation. This understands 
individuals in terms of process and relations. It can be characterised very 
roughly as follows. The individual can be understood only relative to the 
preindividual. These are not discrete substances, but phases in an ongoing 
individuating process. Individual structure emerges out of the 
preindividual. The preindividual is the condition for individuation: the 
reservoir of real potential, prior to structuration as an individual. It is 
always conserved after individuation, primed to spill over into further 
transformation. Alongside the individual, individuation also produces a 
specific, associated milieu, to which it essentially relates. This relation 
between individual and milieu is the ‘location’ of the preindividual. As 
                                               
21 This also instates a categorial divide between humans and nonhumans. Lack is a based in 
an oppositional logic of identity-in-diﬀerence. 
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Pascal Chabot writes, “[t]o exist is to be connected”.22 These relations are 
not accidents aﬀecting a pre-given individual, but what bring that 
individual into being. The individual is not in relation; it is relation. An 
individual, then, exists as an unfolding trajectory. It is never self-identical 
or complete, but one phase of becoming, the temporary crystallisation of 
a set of preindividual potentials. While there is structure or stability, it is 
an outcome of ‘underlying’ operation or process. 
 
Simondon and Technology 
For Simondon technology is a kind of individuation: a movement from 
abstract to concrete, called concretisation. Invention begins with an end or 
predictable outcome in mind. The object in its primitive form is abstract: 
a blueprint describing an assembly of elements, each of which is a “closed 
system” with a discrete structure.23 During their ‘perfection’, elements take 
on extra functions that the original design did not anticipate. The technical 
object acquires a range that exceeds original intention “due to the 
superabundant eﬃcacy of the created object when it is a true invention”.24 
And, it gradually realises relations to an associated milieu. So, where the 
abstract object was entirely artificial—and identified with the inventor’s 
goals—a concrete object has a mode of existence irreducible to human 
artifice or natural law, that “approximates the mode of existence of natural 
                                               
22 Pascal Chabot, The Philosophy of Simondon: Between Technology and Individuation, trans. 
Aliza Krefetz and Graeme Kirkpatrick (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 77. 
23 Gilbert Simondon, Du mode d'existence des objets techniques (Paris: Éditions Aubier, 2012), 
21. 
24 Gilbert Simondon, Imagination et invention, course material (hand-out) published in the 
Bulletin de Psychologie, December 1965, pp. 395-414, February 1966, pp. 916-29, and 
March 1966, pp. 1074-95, p. 1197 (published in 2008, Editions de la Transparence). While 
objects are not precisely agentic, agency is not precisely in the inventor: potentials within 
technology solicit certain responses. 
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objects”.25 To simplify: the concrete object has essentially an openness that 
the abstract object lacked. It is loosened—albeit not completely—from 
human origin and ascribed purpose. Perfection does not instantiate 
Platonic form, a complete, abstract thing given in one blow.26 It 
inaugurates a pattern open to dynamic transformation, an object with a 
higher degree of openness, a greater “margin of indetermination”.27 
 
Relational Disability 
So, the basic insights of Simondon are: the preindividual—transformative 
potential—is primary; this gives both living and technical a fundamentally 
open, processual character. This is overlooked when attention is restricted 
to structure, which then becomes exhaustive of the individual or object, 
whose genetic operations are thereby ignored. Sure enough, the modern 
metaphysical chauvinism towards the self-identical submits such openness 
to a logic of closure, generating both an anthropocentric view of the 
human (as self-identical, self-contained and autonomous), and an 
instrumental view of technology (the ‘labour paradigm’). The labour 
paradigm doesn’t only address work, but rather describes a disposition 
towards technology—that aﬀects life at all levels and scales—that ignores 
its genesis, its human relation, and above all its openness: “the inherence 
[in technicity] of values going beyond utility".28 I’ll dwell on this a little 
before turning to Simondon’s positive implications. 
                                               
25 Ibid., 46. 
26 True perfection only comes through concretisation. This is not defined via external criteria 
like utility or profitability. 
27 Simondon, MEOT 11. Indeed, it is precisely indeterminacy that becomes concrete: 
“concretisation lies in the solidity of openness”. LaMarre, "Afterword: Humans and 
Machines", 92. 
28 Simondon, MEOT 222. 
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This closure—of human and technology within themselves, and from 
each other—is surely significant for disability, grounding the abstract 
autonomy that underpins normal function (and that echoes 
instrumentalism). This allows humans to understand themselves as fully 
autonomous even as their actions are technologically-enabled.29 Yet this 
implies ‘context-transcending abilities’, which would in turn suggest a 
self-suﬃcient, complete human. As Stiegler rightly suggests, this recalls 
the state of nature, which represents “the absence of relation”.30 
Instead I’m suggesting that there is a banal, low level prostheticity to 
the average and everyday. Much apparent complementarity between 
‘normal’ humans and environments is not spontaneous, but the outcome 
of activities, both historical and contemporary, that render the world thus 
through harmonisation with a valued functional ideal. Rather than a 
universally valid—that is, ‘normal’—mode, there are normalised relations 
that prioritise certain modes.31 Importantly, the underlying logic 
understands these relations as between determinate entities—the normal 
individual, the neutral tool—and remains at the level of structure, without 
attending to their engendering processes. Rather than ability or disability 
antecedent of situation, there are enabling and disabling relations. ‘Ability’ 
correlates less with innate features, and more with temporally-normalised 
relations between bodies and a world of technologies (broadly construed) 
that en-able them.32 Conversely, disability reduces neither to physical 
                                               
29 Bruno Latour, "On Technical Mediation", Common Knowledge 3, no. 2 (1994): 29-64; "An 
Attempt at a “Compositionist Manifesto”", New Literary History 41, no. 3 (2010): 471-
490; We Have Never Been Modern, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1993). 
30 Stiegler, Technics and Time 128. 
31 Put diﬀerently, ‘ability’ is not pre-existent but situationally-enacted. 
32 This involves both long-term evolutionary, and short-term existential, timespans. 
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properties nor inherent lack.33 It is a spatiotemporal event, that occurs 
where a merely atypical body encounters others with incongruent 
orientations, where aﬀordances are absent or inapt.34 Disability and ability 
are relations between real bodies and technologies, where the contribution 
of the latter is eﬀaced. 
 
Transductive Prosthesis and Technical Ethics 
Now I’ll turn to the aﬃrmative register of Simondon’s thought, to make 
some suggestions for alternative ways to think the human-technology 
relation, which I’ll call transductive prosthesis: transductive because 
neither participant is entirely the agent, and every individuation is 
conditioned upon earlier individuations, that conserve their own potential 
for transformation. While Stiegler is right that technical evolution 
transforms the human, this is not based in compensation for vulnerability. 
There is nothing essentially lacking in humans (or any individual). They 
are instead characterised by potential to diﬀerentiate characteristic of the 
living in general.35 Humans and technological objects each contain this 
potential, essentially but diﬀerently. There is something human in 
technology, not because they are makers and users—which would fall back 
into a dualism of freedom and bondage—but because the technical 
                                               
33 For this reason, I consider impairment a merely medical term with limited applicability, 
and do not consider impairment qua objective abnormality part of the furniture of the 
universe. Henceforth I will use anomalous embodiment to denote mere atypicality, and 
disability to describe limiting situations based in assumptions that impairments are 
objectively real. 
34 The ’normal body’ it is given implicitly at one pole of the body-world circuit, instantiated 
within milieus of various kinds. ‘Normal’ possibilities draw one in because these are taken 
implicitly as ‘what everyone does’, and because contexts advert to such aﬀordances. So, 
environments solicit unrealisable possibilities: however eﬀectively the wheelchair-user 
comports themselves, the environment welcomes a motility other than theirs. 
35 Humans are but one vector within a continuity of living individuation. 
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individual is an elaboration of potentialities within humans.36 Technology 
doesn’t contradict the living. It ramifies it. Yet due to their openness, 
technologies retain a kind of quasi-agency that is not parasitic upon 
humans. The human-technology relation is co-individuation: a “dialogue 
between humans and machines” that engages preindividual forces in 
human and technology that individuate together.37 Humans are 
“conductors in the world orchestra of technology around them”, an 
orchestra of which they are also part.38 Simondon will explicitly suggest 
that the human is not a pre-given set of somatic or cognitive capacities, 
but a living being that enters into relations with technical objects in an 
associated milieu. 
I’ll finally make three brief recommendations about disability-
technology relations in a Simondonian key. First, taking individuation 
seriously means resisting closure and teleology in biology and technology 
alike. Remaining with structure only discloses regularity, and (somewhat) 
warrants the understanding of humans as (however imperfect) 
instantiations of ideal form. Instrumental understandings of health and 
technology leave their categories untouched, and reproduce metaphysical 
commitments to closure within individuality that occludes the reality and 
primacy of relation. A related point concerns technical objects. If these 
have a genesis and lineage that is implicated concurrently within human 
becoming, we should attend to the anthropocentric—not merely the 
human—in prosthesis. I’ve already mentioned the reduction of technology 
to productivity—due to the longstanding tendency to think the human-
                                               
36 Nonetheless technology is not constitutive in Stiegler’s sense. It is merely one—albeit 
highly significant—trajectory of individuation. 
37 LaMarre, "Afterword: Humans and Machines", 98. 
38 Technical evolution is not linear progress from object to object, but return to and 
reactivation of what is ontologically prior through “reimmersion in the preindividual”. 
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technology relation analogically with mastery and bondage—that short-
circuits technology’s potential. Perhaps technological solutions for 
disability implicitly tend towards normalisation not simply because of 
present economic imperatives, but also because productivity is sedimented 
within technology’s purported role or purpose.39 
The obverse practice attends to processes of taking-form. Such in-
forming is not construction by humans out of passive nonhumanity. 
Simondon reontologises bodies: not as substances but as real trajectories 
of becoming. There is an ontology of disability. It is neither biological nor 
social, but individuated within many, real but contingent, relations that, 
through repeated practices, acquire an apparent fixity. It is this fixity might 
be contested, by recognising “technical concretisation and the transductive 
relation between humans and technology”.40 And, by following material 
processes that aﬀect which bodies inhabit the world: how and why such 
productions happen, and that it could have been otherwise.41 
Finally, there is taking-up of potential towards a more open future. 
Liberating technology from productivity releases its inventive power. My 
former references to ‘the human’ were only pragmatic. I advocate a non-
anthropocentric theory of technical relations that relinquishes emphasis 
upon merely abstract autonomy and function—with their implicit purity 
and closure—for plurality and connection. Invention can take many 
forms. There is moderate: pragmatic living-with-machines that substitutes 
                                               
39 Jean-Hugues Barthélémy, Life and Technology: An Inquiry Into and Beyond Simondon, trans. 
Barnaby Norman (Lüneberg: Meson Press, 2015), 53. 
40 Donald A. Landes, "Individuals and Technology: Gilbert Simondon, From Ontology to 
Ethics to Feminist Bioethics", Continental Philosophy Review 47, no. 2 (2014). 
41 Though beyond the scope of this paper, consideration of recent developments in biology 
that prioritise contingency over genetic determinism—niche construction, non-genetic 
evolution and development, autopoiesis—could be considered in relation to technology, to 
develop a robust, processual account of bodily-technological elaboration, without requiring 
that biology be transcended. 
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relational agency for individual autonomy. Technology still facilitates 
action. However, if technicity assists almost all action, invention is freed 
from approximation of normal modalities. Consider Christina 
Papadimitrou’s ‘becoming en-wheeled’: “a way of being in the world that 
is not merely mechanical or practical”.42 It may even create entirely new 
ways of acting. Or, rather than complementary or supplementary addition 
to bodies, an aesthetic and experimental elaboration. Importantly, as we’ve 
seen, individuation also brings with it an associated milieu. A new 
technical relation is simultaneously the creation of a new milieu. Of 
course, this is already happening in and with bodies everywhere, we just 
need to look for it, and keep bringing it to light. 
 
 
  
                                               
42 Christina Papadimitriou, "Becoming En‐wheeled: The Situated Accomplishment of Re‐
embodiment as a Wheelchair User After Spinal Cord Injury", Disability & Society 23, no. 
7 (2008): 691-704. 
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